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PUBLIC LABOR DISPUTES-A SUGGESTED
APPROACH FOR NEW MEXICO
The fastest growing business in the United States today is government. Over the past three decades the number of public employees
has increased dramatically, both absolutely and in proportion to the
rest of the working force. In July of 1968, over 17 percent of the
total nonagricultural work force of the nation was government
employed. Nearly nine million people were employed at the state
and local level and estimates indicate that by 1975 this number will
increase to 11.4 million.' As a result of the rising level of government employment, membership in public employee unions has
vaulted 2 and demands on the public employer for better wages and
working conditions, and for a larger role in policy making have now
become commonplace. The corresponding increases in government
employment and public employee unionism have been and will continue to be a source of labor disputes in the public sector.
Labor disputes are not strangers to the American economy.
Employees in private industry have long possessed the right to organize, bargain collectively and strike,' and have been quite successful in utilizing these tools to improve their working conditions and
standards of living. However, at common law the public employee
does not possess these rights in most states.4 The jurisdictions where
they are recognized have granted them by statute.'
These facts produce some very curious questions that should con1. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Employment and Earnings, 51
Monthly Report on the Labor Force 45 (August 1968). In October, 1962, the State of New
Mexico and its subdivisions employed over 22,000 people. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
County & City Data Book (1967).
2. See Brinker, Recent Trends of Labor Unions in Government, 12 Lab. L. J. 13, 14-18
(1961).
3. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936); Amalgamated Util.
Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
4. See cases cited notes 20 & 34 infra.
5. The states of Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Wisconsin and Wyoming have
recognized by express legislation the right to organize and join a Anion. See e.g., Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 839.221 (1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 178(D) (1965); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 111.70 (1969).
The states of Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming have authorized the right to bargain collectively to some or all of their public employees. See e.g., Cal. Govt. Code § § 3500-11 (West
Supp. 1968); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70 (1969).
Only Vermont has recognized a right to strike for situations in which the exercise of such
right does not endanger the public health, welfare, or safety. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1704
(Supp. 1968).
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cern anyone interested in a rational approach to public labor disputes. Why are public employees in many states denied some of the
rights which their counterparts in the private sector of the economy
have possessed for years? Are there any sound reasons for different
treatment? Assuming that granting government employees the right
to strike is inimical to the health and welfare of society, will denying
them that right be effective to insure that vital governmental services
will not be interrupted? Are alternative means of achieving better
working conditions, etc., available to the public employee which
would make strikes unnecessary-or at least less desirable? The purpose of this Note is to discuss these questions with particular
emphasis on New Mexico law and to suggest that New Mexico follow
the lead of other states by enacting legislation which would provide
more adequate procedures for settling labor disputes in the public
sector.
THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE

The right of public employees to organize into unions has only
recently come to be recognized. Initially, the concept of public employee unionism was looked upon with considerable disfavor.6 A
statement from a 1943 New York decision is representative of the
early attitude:
To tolerate or recognize any combination of Civil Service em-

ployees of the Government as a labor organization or union is not
only incompatible with the spirit of democracy, but inconsistent

with every principle upon which our Government is founded.
Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that
hired servants of the State can dictate to the Government the hours,
the wages and conditions under which thcy will carry on cssential
services vital to the welfare, safety and security of the citizen. To
admit as true that Government employees have power to halt or
check the functions of Government, unless their demands are
satisfied, is to transfer to them all legislative, executive and judicial
power. Nothing would be more ridiculous.7

This early view was based upon a waiver concept, which served as a
rationale for upholding statutes prohibiting public employees from
engaging in union activities8 as well as certain political activities.9 Its
6. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App.2d 36,
210 P.2d 305 (1949); Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 178 P.2d 537
(1947); King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547 (1947).
7. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 875, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 (Sup. Ct.
1943).
8. CIO v. Dallas, 198 8.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
9. McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
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supporters argued that since the functions of government and the
services it provides are so vital to the welfare of its citizens, and since
public employees voluntarily accept employment, they waive some
of their first amendment rights for the general benefit of society.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have placed the waiver concept in
serious jeopardy." ° The premise that public employment may be
conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights is no longer
A balancing test has been deaccepted without qualification. 1
the free exercise of protected
danger
of
limiting
where
the
veloped
first amendment rights is weighed against the particular state
interest which is sought to be promoted by restricting these rights.
The Supreme Court has not yet decided the question of whether a
state may constitutionally prohibit public employees from organizing
into unions. However, three recent lower federal court decisions have
applied the balancing test to uphold the right to organize.' 2 In each
of these cases, the court was unable to find any paramount public
interest which warranted limiting the first amendment freedom of
association.
The states of the union present a multiplicity of reactions to public employee organization ranging from statutory condemnation to
New Mexico does not prohibit public
constitutional guarantee."
employee union membership by constitution or statute. The right
has been expressly granted by statute only to a specific class of
public employees. N. M. Stat. Ann. § 14-53-15 authorizes
municipalities to recognize an appropriate union representing employees of the municipal transit system in order to qualify for a
federal grant under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964.' '
The enactment of the statute appears to have been motivated by a
desire to make funds available to municipal transit systems rather
than to grant employees the right to organize. It would be extremely
difficult to construe the statute as a recognition of the right of all
public employees within the state to organize since it expressly refers
to municipal transit employees.
The New Mexico courts have not been squarely presented with the
question of whether other public employees may organize. The right
was impliedly recognized in a case involving the authority of a
10. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
11. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967).
12. McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); American Fed. of State,
County & Mun. Employees v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cit. 1969); Atkins v. City of
Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
13. Compare Ala. Code tit. 55, § 317 (1958) with N.J. Const. art. I, § 10.
14. 49 U.S.C. § § 1601-11 (1964).
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municipality to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a
union representing employees of a town-owned public utility.' I No
decisions were found which impliedly recognized the right of public
employees other than those employed by municipalities to organize
into unions. However, in view of the recent trend in the federal
courts elevating the right to organize to constitutional status, the
right is probably firmly established in New Mexico.
THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The importance of effective collective bargaining in the private
sector has long been recognized as essential to meaningful labor relations.' 6 However, the labor laws of many states, including New
Mexico, are made specifically inapplicable to government employees.' ' Unlike the right to organize, collective bargaining is not
considered a constitutionally protected right, and therefore state
legislatures are free to enunciate whatever public policy they wish
concerning collective bargaining by government employees.' 8 No
state specifically precludes public employees from collective bargaining by statute; however, eighteen states have statutes expressly
authorizing it.' 9
Although the states may authorize collective bargaining through
legislation, some courts have held that in the absence of such legislation, the government may not bargain with representatives of public
unions.' 0 The rationale for this rule is that the government employer
is cloaked with continuing legislative discretion over such matters as
hours, wages and working conditions, and to bargain away this
discretion would be an unlawful delegation of legislative authority,
amounting to government by contract rather than government by
law. 2 Another line of cases has departed somewhat from this rule
15. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Town of Farmington, 75 N.M. 393, 405 P.2d
233 (1965).
16. See e.g., Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964);
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife....
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury ... by
encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial
disputes....
17. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-3-21(D)(3) (Supp. 1969).
18. Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
19. See note 5 supra.
20. Miami Water Works Local 654 v. Miami, 157 Fla 445, 26 So.2d 194, 165 A.L.R. 967
(1946); Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); State v. Brotherhood
of Ry. Trainmen, 37 Cal.2d 412, 232 P.2d 857 (1951).
21. See note 17 supra.
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by holding that although the government cannot be forced to bargain
with a public employee union, it may voluntarily negotiate with the
union concerning employment, salaries, grievance procedures and
working conditions of its members, provided there is no statutory
prohibition.2 2
Neither of these views is without shortcomings. First, there are
many bargaining issues-promotions, working conditions and
grievance procedures- within the discretion of administrative officials
which could be made the subject of negotiation without usurping
legislative or executive authority.2 3 For example, in 1962, President
Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 109882" authorizing federal
agencies to bargain to a limited extent with their employees. A study
of its effect ". . . indicated at least forty-four subjects which federal
agencies and employee organizations considered within the scope of
bargaining under the Executive Order."'2 s Although the order concerned collective bargaining in the federal service, the argument
applies as well to state labor relations.
Secondly, even if there are subjects which may be negotiated without being construed as a delegation of legislative or executive
authority or alternatively, even if a governmental organization
voluntarily chooses to negotiate, there is a possibility that the agreement reached would be unenforceable. Some courts have held that in
the absence of express statutory authorization, a government official
may not contract because the agreement would abdicate his duty 2to6
exercise continuing discretion in matters of employee relations.
Thus, even though bargaining between the government and its
employees may under certain circumstances take place without express legislative authority, the binding nature of the agreements
reached is doubtful without such authority.
The status of collective bargaining in the New Mexico public
sector is unclear. Municipal transit employees are the only public
workers expressly authorized by statute to bargain collectively with
their employers.2 7 Only one case gives any indication of whether
public employees not covered by this statute may bargain collectively with their employers. InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical
22. Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482, 31
A.L.R.2d 1133 (1951).
23. See Herrick, Unions for Government Employees-Their Implications, N.Y.U. 15th
Conf. Lab. 129, 134 (1962).
24. 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962).
25. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 1451, Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Federal Service 1, 9-64 (1965).
26. See e.g., Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (Ct. App.
1945), and cases cited note 17 supra.
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-53-15 (Repl. 1968).
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Workers v. Town of Farmington2" involved the question of whether
the town of Farmington had authority to make a binding agreement,
consummated through a process of collective bargaining, with a
union representing employees of a town-owned public utility.
Municipalities were authorized by N. M. Stat. Ann. § 14-19-12 to
enact an ordinance establishing a merit system for the "hiring, pro2
motion, discharge and general regulation of municipal employees." 9
It was noted by the court that under N. M. Stat. Ann. § 14-19-13:
[t] he provisions of an ordinance establishing a merit system and all
rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall become a part of
the contract of employment between the city and all employees

thereof in positions covered by the merit system when the employment relationship exists at the time of the passage of such
ordinance.... 30

The court held that a merit system established pursuant to
§ 14-19-12 would not be self-executing because the statute provided
for selection of a personnel board to administer it. If an ordinance
was enacted establishing a merit system, but a personnel board had
not been appointed, or an appointed personnel board had not yet
adopted rules and regulations, the municipality would have the
authority to bargain with the employees because § 14-19-13 recognized contracts between a municipality and its employees. "While
collective bargaining contracts are not specifically mentioned in
§ 14-19-13, such agreements would certainly be within the
language." 3 1 However, the court indicated that if a personnel board
is appointed under an ordinance establishing a merit system and the
board adopts rules and regulations providing for matters usually contained in a collective bargaining agreement, the authority of the
municipality to enter such an agreement with its employees should
be denied because the agreement would conflict with the regulatory
power of the municipality and constitute bargaining away legislative
discretion.
Thus, it appears that municipal employees may bargain with their
employers only upon matters not within the scope of a merit system
when rules and regulations have been adopted under an ordinance
establishing such a system. When no rules and regulations have been
adopted, they may bargain on any matter concerning their hiring,
28. 75 N.M. 393, 405 P.2d 233 (1965).
29. This section now appears in substantially the same form as N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 14-12-4(A)-(B) (Repl. 1968).
30. 75 N.M. at 397, 405 P.2d at 236, citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-19-13 (1953). This
section now appears in substantially the same form as N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-12-4(C)-(D)
(Repl. 1968).
31. 75 N.M. at 397, 405 P.2d at 236.
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promotion, discharge and general regulation. The agreements reached
in either situation would be binding. However, as a practical matter,
the period of time between the enactment of an ordinance establishing a merit system and the adoption of implementing regulations
by the personnel board is likely to be very short. Once the regulations are in force, the municipality is limited to discussing subjects
not covered by the merit system, which are apt to be few.
The status of the collective bargaining rights of non-municipal
employees in New Mexico is governed to some extent by International. In 1961, the state legislature passed the Personnel Act 3 2
which established a system of personnel administration based solely
on qualification and ability. Under the rule of International,the state
agencies covered by the act would not have the authority to bargain
with their employees concerning matters within the scope of the
regulations adopted pursuant to the act. Among the matters required
in the regulations by the act are a pay plan, discharge and demotion
procedures, and hours of work, holidays and leave. 3 Thus, many of
the matters which are most important to the employee are not
within the permitted area of negotiation.
Procedures for collective bargaining between the government and
its employees in New Mexico are grossly inadequate. The number of
subjects that may be negotiated are severely limited and agreements
reached on those that may be negotiated are probably not binding.
Many problems in public employment are complex. Moreover, the
problems of one type of public employee may be quite different
from those of others. It is difficult for the state legislature to predict,
much less solve, the variety of labor disputes that may occur in the
future. The disputes should be handled at the administrative level as
they occur. Without legislative authority, however, administrative
officials are helpless to deal with labor problems effectively. Suggested solutions to these difficulties are discussed, infra.
THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
At common law, employees in the public service have generally
been denied the right to strike, although a few cases have permitted
strikes by statutory construction.3 4 The reason most often given for
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 5-4-28 to -46 (Repl. 1966).
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-4-36 (Repl. 1966).
34. City of Los Angeles v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App.2d 36, 210 P.2d
305 (1949); Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482, 31
A.L.R.2d 1133 (1951); City of Detroit v. Division 26, Amal. Ass'n of St. Employees, 332
Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill.2d 567, 207 N.E.2d
427 (1965).
Cases authorizing strikes by statutory construction: Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority
v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 54 Cal.2d 684, 355 P.2d 905 (1960); Board of Educ. v.
Local 63, Pub. School Employees, 233 Minn. 144, 45 N.W.2d 797 (1951).
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the denial of the right is the sovereignty of the governmental emA strike against a public body is often thought of as
ployer.3
equivalent to a revolt against governmental authority and therefore
comes close to the crime of treason. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
advanced this theory when he said:
... I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics have no
place in the functions of any organization of government employees... A strike of public employees manifests nothing less than
an intent on their part to obstruct the operations of government
until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the
paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support it, is
unthinkable and intolerable.36

This theory has been criticized as a "fiction" in public labor relations
since it has no more relevance to modern labor relations in the public
service than it does to other areas of state and municipal law. It is
strange that the government can impose a higher standard of fairness
in labor relations on the private employer than it imposes on itself.
Other reasons advanced by courts and commentators for denying
the right to strike include the possible danger to public health and
safety which may result from a strike by public employees; 3 the
availability of the political process to achieve employee aims coupled
with the benevolence of the public employer; 3" and the responsibility assumed by public employees, by virtue of their acceptance
of government employment, to refrain from interfering with the
operation of government services. 3 9
There is no doubt much validity to such arguments. Many government services are obviously essential, and a disruption of these services often has a serious detrimental effect on the health and welfare
of society.
The recent strike of the New York Transit Workers Union ... prevented one-half of New York City's working force from reaching
their jobs, and left hundreds stranded with no access to their homes.
Before the strike was over, many hospital clinics were forced to
close, and the city's blood bank supply dwindled to a dangerously
35. See note 22 supra.
36. Comment, LaborProblems in Public Employment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 105, 118, citing
letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to L. C. Stewart, President, National Fed'n of Fed.
Employees, Aug. 16, 1937.
37. Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen, 52 Wash.2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099
(1958).
38. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App.2d
36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); Note, Government Employees and Unionism, 54 Harv. L. Rev.
1360, 1364-65 (1941).
39. See note 9 supra.
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low level. The strike cost the transit authority $243,000 a day, and
retail sales were4 0off 41% resulting in a loss of nearly $100 million a
day to the city.

However, strikes in the private sector can also be seriously detrimental to the economy and the public welfare, yet, these strikes will
not be enjoined unless they would result in a national emergency.
Work stoppages in many essential private industries could have a far
more serious effect than one by the janitors at the state capitol. Yet,
the latter would be prohibited, while the former would not. Moreover, strikes of some public employees do not constitute as serious a
threat to the health and safety of society as strikes by others. For
example, a strike by playground supervisors of a city-operated summer recreation program would be far less detrimental than one by
city policemen or firemen.
These distinctions have led many commentators to suggest different treatment of public employees performing services that vary in
importance. One approach has been suggested which would permit
4
work stoppages for employees performing "nonessential" services.
However, there are disagreements over which services are essential
and which are not, as well as whether the determination should be
made by the legislative branch or the judiciary.4 2
Denying employees in the public service the right to strike has also
been criticized as reducing the effectiveness of collective bargaining.
As one commentator said, "[g] ranting the right to engage in collective bargaining ...

and then denying ...

the right to strike is like

inviting a child to a candy parlor without allowing the child to taste
the candy. 4
Many states have expressly prohibited public employee strikes by
statute.4 4 These statutes provide a variety of penalties for violation,
ranging from none at all to a termination of employment.4 5 Of those
providing for dismissal, some permit reinstatement of striking em40. See Comment, note 36 supra at 117.
41. Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 391, 408 (1961).
42. Note, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 549,
557 (1966).
43. Clary, Pitfalls of Collective Bargainingin PublicEmployment, 18 Lab. L. J. 406, 408
(1967).
44. See note 45 infra.
45. For statutes providing no penalty, see e.g., Cal. Labor Code § § 1960-63 (19---);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § § 48-802 to -810 (1960); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 243.730-243.760 (1963).
For statutes providing for a termination of employment, see e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ § 179.51-179.55 (1966); N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 108 (McKinney Supp. 1968); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 4117 (1964); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 215 (1963).
Only the federal statute makes the offense a felony. 69 Stat. 625, 5 U.S.C. § 118r
(1964).
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ployees under certain conditions, but most are generally quite inflexible and do not give administrators a choice of sanctions to apply
to the particular circumstances of a given case. 4 6 The effectiveness
of the prohibitions and the penalties has been limited. When conditions have reached the point where a strike has become necessary
because of lack of alternatives, the legislative sanctions have not been
effective deterrents to strikes. Moreover, many of the penalties are so
severe that administrators find it difficult to enforce them. The primary concern of administrators is to reinstate the interrupted government service, and many have refused to implement the legislative
sanctions in order to achieve this objective.4" Moreover, it is often
impossible to reinstate the service expeditiously without rehiring the
striking employees.
New Mexico has only one statute dealing with strikes in the public
service. That statute prohibits strikes by employees of the municipal
transit systems.4 8 Thus, the status of the right to strike in the New
Mexico public sector is determined by the common law, which
uniformly denies the right.
Many supporters and critics of strikes by governmental employees
appear to be directing their attention toward the wrong issues. Few
will disagree that some strikes in the public sector can have serious
effects upon the communities in which they have occurred. Determining which governmental services are "essential" or which are
similar to those in the private sector for purposes of delineating a
limited right to strike does not reach the important issue. The problems of employees performing "essential" services will remain. Nor
does prohibiting strikes and imposing penalties for work stoppages
help preserve uninterrupted government services, since strikes continue to occur in the face of the prohibitions and penalties. Attention should instead be focused on the goals of and the reasons for
strikes. Employees strike for a variety of reasons-better pay, working conditions and hours, and more voice in policy making concerning their employment are but a few. The strike occurs when
communication lines between their representatives and employers
have broken down. Emphasis should be placed upon establishing or
improving negotiation procedures between the government and its
46. Compare Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 215.3 (Supp. 1964) with Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art.
5154-c(3) (Supp. 1964).
47. After the settlement of the 1957 New York City Transit Authority strike, the strict
statutory penalties for engaging in an illegal strike were not invoked because, in the words of
the chief administrator: "We'd never have got the subways running." Illinois Legislative
Council, Rep't No. 132, Public Employee Labor Relations at 13 (1958).
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-53-16 (Repl. 1968).
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employees. Since the courts are ill equipped to provide these procedures, the task belongs to the legislatures.4 9
ALTERNATIVES TO THE STRIKE
Society is faced with a serious dilemma in the area of public labor
relations. On the one hand is the necessity of maintaining an uninterrupted flow of government services to the taxpaying public,
which precludes strikes by the employees providing them; on the
other is the need to provide employees in the public service with an
effective means of airing grievances and improving working conditions. New Mexico's approach to the dilemma has been passive. It has
neither expressly granted nor denied public employees the appropriate tools necessary to settle and avoid labor disputes. However,
the inaction has in effect withheld these tools, since they generally
are not recognized at common law.
It is incumbent upon the legislature to establish procedures to
resolve and avoid public labor disputes. The emphasis should be on
procedures which would make the strike weapon less necessary and
less desirable to aggrieved employees. The approach should not,
however, be limited to assisting employees. Legislators should realize
that improved procedures would serve to carry out their responsibility to the public, since government services will be interrupted
less often and a lower standard of public service avoided.
The primary goal of any comprehensive approach to labor relations should be the promotion of effective collective bargaining
between employer and employee, whereby the parties can mutually
agree on a satisfactory solution to their problems. Some have maintained that denying the right to strike severely restricts the effectiveness of collective bargaining on the part of the employee. Without it,
it is said, his bargaining position is unequal to that of the employer.
However, armed with the power to strike, his bargaining position
becomes disproportionate to that of the employer. It is conceivable
that the employer will be faced with a choice between acceding to
the excessive demands of the union, or a serious interruption of a
vital government service. Either choice can place him in an un49. At this point it should be noted that many state and municipal employees in New
Mexico are members of unions and that contrary to the conclusions just reached, many of
these unions have bargained with the public employer and two have engaged in strikes. This
does not mean that either device is authorized by existing state law. It seems that both sides
of the public labor dispute are forced to ignore state law in order to settle their differences.
Hopefully, this note will show that it is much better to provide methods for preventing and
coping with labor disputes through legislation than to leave the parties to the dispute free to
rely upon or ignore existing state law depending upon the strength of their bargaining
positions.
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favorable position in terms of public opinion. It is therefore extremely important to both sides of a labor dispute-and to the
public-to devise effective alternatives to the strike.
The alternatives most often suggested are political persuasion,
mediation, compulsory arbitration and fact finding. It should be
emphasized that these are alternatives to the strike and not to collective bargaining. Public policy should seek to encourage collective
bargaining whenever possible. Some of these alternatives are less desirable than others because the tendency has been to use them as
substitutes for, rather than extensions of, the process of collective
bargaining.
PoliticalPersuasion
Political persuasion is probably the least desirable alternative to
the strike. Although public employees have the opportunity to lobby
for new laws which would provide increased wages and new sources
of revenue for improved benefits, the usefulness of such an approach
is limited. First, the results obtained through this approach are apt to
be piecemeal. It is impractical to use specific legislation to resolve a
labor problem each time one occurs. Secondly, many labor disputes
and problems require immediate attention and the process of legislation is slow. Such problems lend themselves to resolution at the
administrative rather than the legislative level (although ulitimately,
the administrator must be given the authority by statute). Finally,
although political persuasion was available to public employees long
before the right to organize and bargain collectively were recognized,
it has proved to be ineffective to avoid strikesMediation
Mediation is the process whereby a neutral third party helps the
parties to a labor dispute reach a voluntary agreement.' 0 The suggestions and recommendations of the mediator are not binding on
the parties-his function being only to assist the disputants in making
their own agreement. The theory of mediation is based on the idea
that suggestions made by a neutral party are more likely to be
accepted than identical ones proposed by a party to the dispute. It is
thus an extension of the collective bargaining process, serving to help
the parties talk to one another about their differences before their
relations deteriorate to the point where a strike is the only course of
action remaining.
Mediation has been successfully used in many states to resolve
labor disputes in the public service. Current state statutes vary in
50. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, note 25 supra at 54.
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their methods of implementing the mediation process. In Michigan,
mediation is available at the request of either party; if one party
refuses, the state agency has the authority to force that party to
attend the mediation hearing."1 Wisconsin allows mediation to be
used only upon the request of both parties," 2 while in New York,5 it
may be ordered by the state Public Employee Relations Board. 3
Michigan's approach is useful when one of the parties is reluctant to
negotiate and its mandatory appearance feature forces the
recalcitrant party to appear in hopes of breaking down resistance at
an early stage. However, it does not reach the situation where neither
party requests mediation. This may occur because both sides may
not wish to initiate the mediation process out of fear of showing
weakness. New York's statute covers this situation. The best approach would appear to be a blend of the Michigan and New York
approaches whereby mediation could occur if only one or if neither
party requests it.
The statutes also vary with respect to the selection of the
5 4
mediator. California permits the parties to consult outsiders;
Michigan and Wisconsin provide formal mediation by general labor
and New York provides formal mediation by specialists
mediators;
in public employee disputes.5 6 California's approach has the advantage of providing the parties with considerable leeway in selecting
their mediator. However, labor disputes in public employment have
problems quite different from those in the private sector, stemming
from the necessity of protecting the interests of a third party-the
public. Hence, it would seem more advisable to follow New York's
approach of selecting the mediator from specialists in public employee disputes.
Compulsory Arbitration
Arbitration may be either compulsory or voluntary. Voluntary
arbitration, often referred to as fact finding, is discussed, infra. The
difference between mediation and compulsory arbitration is that in
the latter, the dispute is turned over to the arbitrator whose suggestions and recommendations are binding on both parties; in the
former, the mediator merely assists the parties in making their own
agreement and his suggestions are not binding.
51. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423-207 (1967).
52. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70 (1969).
53. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
54. Cal. Govt. Code § 3505.2 (West 1968).
55. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § § 423.207, 423-25 (1967); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70
(1969).
56. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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The arbitration machinery may take three general forms. In the
tripartite approach, each party chooses one member of the panel and
then mutually agrees upon a neutral third panel member." Another
approach utilizes the services of a professional arbitrator, usually
chosen by agreement of the parties to the dispute."8 In a third
approach, the arbitrator is selected by an outside body.' 9
Compulsory arbitration has been characterized as the only effective alternative to the strike since it is the only way in which the
government employer may be bound by an agreement against its
will. 6 0 It is argued that it is the only tool other than the strike which
provides the public employee with sufficient bargaining power.
Compulsory arbitration is not without shortcomings, however.
First, allowing third parties to resolve disputes by making decisions
which are binding on the government may be an unconstitutional
delegation of authority.' ' It is argued that submitting the dispute to
an arbitrator whose decision is binding on the government would be
an abdication of governmental responsibility. If the public body involved in the dispute is a local governmental unit, the abdication
argument loses its vitality, since the local official will not have
abdicated his responsibility. Instead, it will have been removed by a
higher governmental authority (assuming of course, that the legislature has provided for compulsory arbitration by statute).2 It can
also be argued that the legislature itself abdicates its governmental
responsibility by providing for the settlement of labor disputes in the
public service through compulsory arbitration. This objection is
removed if the arbitrator is a governmental body or if the delegating
statute sets out sufficient standards to guide the arbitrator in making
his decision.' 3
A second weakness of compulsory arbitration is that instead of
being an aid to collective bargaining, it is relied upon as a substitute.
Since collective bargaining is relatively new in the public sector, both
sides are apt to be inexperienced and lacking the bargaining skills
57. See, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 217 (Supp. 1969); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.36
(1966).
58. See Coulson, Labor Arbitration-The Insecure Profession, N.Y.U. 20th Conf. Lab.
131 (1967).
59. See Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of
Strikes in the PublicSector, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 260, 280 (1969).
60. See Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Service, 17 Lab. L. J. 138
(1966).
61. Id.
62. See Comment, note 59 supra at 284.
63. Id. at 284-85. For an indication of what standards may be acceptable for arbitration
of government employer disputes see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.239 (Supp. 1969);
R.I. Gen. Stats. Ann. § § 28-9.1-10 (Supp. 1969); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular
Firemen's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 1969).
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necessary to reach agreements and resolve disputes. Instead of
sharpening bargaining skills, the availability of compulsory arbitration may hinder their development, particularly if the parties rely
upon it whenever an obstacle in the bargaining process occurs.
A third shortcoming of compulsory arbitration is that decisions in
the resolution of labor disputes are made by a body not directly
responsible to the public. In the settlement of governmental labor
disputes, the effect the settlement has on the public should always be
considered, since it finances the services through the payment of
taxes and is the recipient of them. If the arbitrator is not responsible
to the public, its interests may not be adequately protected. The
problem could be avoided if the arbitrator is a governmental body
which would be responsible to the public, at least indirectly.
Fact Finding
Fact finding, sometimes called advisory arbitration has also been
used as an alternative to the strike. 6 4 It has been defined as "an
investigation by a public body aimed primarily at discovering the
6
issues, and usually making recommendations for their settlement." 5
Fact finding is in many ways similar to compulsory arbitration and
mediation, but the procedure is probably best characterized as a
hybrid of the two. It is usually carried out by a panel which
examines the merits of the dispute-often by conducting hearings
and collecting evidence through the use of the subpeona
power. 6 -and makes recommendations to a political authority6 " or
to the public.6 8 It differs from compulsory arbitration because the
recommendations are not binding, and from mediation because its
purpose is not to reach a compromise between the parties, but to
determine the most practical settlement of the dispute on the basis
of the facts. The rationale behind the procedure is that if the facts
are determined by a neutral third party, the disputants will be induced to agree either on the basis of the facts as made apparent to
both the employer and the union, or by public opinion forcing them
to reach an agreement based on the fact finder's recommendations.6 9
In the states where it has been used, fact finding has been quite
64. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.454(27) (Supp. 1963); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179.57 (1966); PaStat. Ann. tit. 43, § 215.1 (Supp. 1964); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.70 (1969).
65. Northrup, Fact Findingin Labor Disputes: The State's Experience, 17 Ind. & Lab.
Rel. Rev. 114, 115 (1963).
66. See e.g., N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § § 205(5)0), (k) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
67. See e.g., N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209(3)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
68. See e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.25 (1967); N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209(c)
(McKinney Supp. 1968).
69. See Note, note 42 supra at 566.
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successful in preventing public employee strikes, often before the
fact finder has made a report of his recommendations.
In Massachusetts for example, out of 200 cases submitted to fact

finders in two-year period, 140 were resolved prior to the issuance of

recommendations. In Michigan, 56% of such cases were resolved
prior to recommendations. 7 0

When the disagreement has not been resolved prior to the issuance of
the report, the recommendations have usually been accepted by the
parties.
[01 ut of fifty cases in Wisconsin in the two-year period, the fact
...
finder's recommendations were accepted in 90% of them, and in
factonly three cases were strikes experienced. In Massachusetts,
7
finding was used in 200 cases, but only four strikes ensued. 1
The use of fact finders for settling labor disputes in the public
service has been criticized, because when it is available, the parties
may tend to rely on the fact finder, rather than settling their disputes
through the process of collective bargaining. 7 2 This is no doubt true
to a certain extent. However, although communication between employer and employee via collective bargaining should be promoted by
public policy, it should not be the ultimate goal. That goal should be
the peaceful settlement of labor problems and the avoidance of
crippling strikes. Collective bargaining is the most desirable method
of resolving these disputes, but is not the only one. Since experience
has proved fact finding to be a successful means of settling labor
disputes in the public sector, it should continue to be used when
collective bargaining has reached an impasse.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout this Note, inadequacies in New Mexico law
concerning labor relations in the public service have been pointed
out. Although problems in this area have not as yet seriously affected
the state, sooner or later they will occur as the number of public
employees increases, and as employees become aware of many of the
procedures in use in other states. It is incumbent upon the state
legislature to establish a comprehensive approach to these problems
before they occur. A suggested approach follows:
(1) Statutory recognition of the right of public employees to
organize into unions.
(2) Statutory recognition of the right of public employees to
70. See Comment, note 59 supra at 279, n. 94.
71. Id. at 279, note 95.
72. See Northrup, note 65 supra.
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bargain collectively with their employers, worded in such a way as to
constitute a statement of public policy encouraging collective bargaining as a means of resolving labor disputes in the public service.
(a) The statute should set out a procedure by which an appropriate bargaining unit representing the employees would be recognized. (A unit selected by a stated percentage of the employees
would be one method).
(b) The statute should specifically state the matters which
would be permitted subjects of negotiation.
(3) Statutory prohibition of strikes by all public employees-without penalties-worded in such a way as to constitute a statement of
public policy against such strikes.
(4) Creation of a state Public Labor Commission, independent of
the state Labor and Industrial Commission, which would supervise
and provide services for the settlement of labor disputes in the public
service. The Commission should have the following authority and
responsibilities:
(a) Upon the request of either the appropriate bargaining
representative of the employees or the appropriate representative of
the public employer, or within the discretion of the Commission in
the absence of a request, the Commission should appoint a mediator,
experienced in the settlement of public labor disputes, to assist the
parties in reaching an agreement. The Commission should not
appoint a mediator unless it has been shown to the Commission's
satisfaction, that the parties have made a good faith effort to
negotiate on their own.
(b) Upon the request of either the appropriate bargaining
representative of the employees or the appropriate representative of
the public employer, or within the discretion of the Commission in
the absence of a request, the Commission should appoint a fact
finding panel to make findings of fact and non-binding recommendations for the settlement of the dispute.
(1) The panel should consist of a representative of the
union, a representative of the public employer, and a neutral third
member, experienced in the settlement of public labor disputes,
chosen by agreement of the parties.
(2) The panel should be given the power to subpoena
witnesses and experts in public labor disputes, to conduct hearings
and collect evidence.
(3) The panel should be required to file a report of its
findings and recommendations with the Commission. The report
should also be made public, preferably in newspapers of general
circulation throughout the state.
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(4) The Commission should not appoint a fact finding
panel unless it has been shown to the Commission's satisfaction, that
the parties have made a good faith effort to negotiate on their own.
(c) The Commission should permit mediation and fact finding
place simultaneously if, in its discretion, a settlement can be
take
to
reached and a strike avoided only by using both.
(d) The Commission should have the authority to compel an
unwilling party to attend mediation and fact finding hearings.
(5) For policemen and firemen, whose uninterrupted services are
absolutely essential, a system of compulsory arbitration could be
alternatively available with fact finding. The Commission could serve
as the arbitration panel and the subjects which may be negotiated
and the standards by which it must operate must be carefully
specified by the legislature.
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